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1 introduction: The political and legal beginnings
What happened to criminal procedure in Livonia during the Swedish period? And to 
what extent is the development specifically linked to Sweden, or to a European devel-
opement more generally? Livonia became part of Sweden through the Truce of Altmark 
in 1629, after having belonged to Poland for almost 70 years (1561–1629). The Livonian 
Confederation, dissolved in 1561 as a result of the Polish-Swedish war, had been a loose 
entity consisting of five relatively independent units (the lands of the Livonian Order, 
the Archbishopric of Riga, and the Bishoprics of Courland, Dorpat, and Ösel-Wiek), 
which were also internally anything but effectively centralised. The lack of centralisa-
tion had brought independence to the local land-owning nobility, and the tradition had 
very much survived the Polish period. The tradition of the nobility’s great independence 
continued in the Swedish period, not the least because Swedish noblemen now held high 
stakes themselves, having been enfeoffed on large estates in the conquered Livonia as 
rewards for their war services. Their position was, therefore, considerably stronger than 
that of the nobility in Sweden proper. 
Another facet adding to the Livonian nobility’s independence was that the province 
was never incorporated into the Swedish Realm, which comprised only Sweden and Fin-
land. This meant that the Livonians were not represented in the Swedish Diet, the local 
Ritterschaft holding its own Landtag instead.1 
* Professor of Comparative Legal History, University of Helsinki.
1 The question of incorporation had arisen when Livonia was conquered in the late 1620s. The first Gov-
ernor-General, Johan Skytte, had been in favour of the incorporation, whereas Axel Oxenstierna was op-
posed to the idea. The latter’s solution was then adopted in the Fundamental Law (Regeringsform) of 1634, 
which sharply distinguished between the core of the Realm, Sweden-Finland, and the provinces. Rosen, 
“Statsledning och provinspolitik under Sveriges stormaktstid: en författningshistorisk skiss”in Scandia 17 
(1946), 224–270. 
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The pressures for unification only grew in the 1680s and 1690s, as the crown post-
poned a major part of the enfeoffments in the Realm, Livonia included, in the so-called 
Great Reduction. In 1691, King Charles XI refused to accept the Livonian nobility’s claim 
that King Sigismund’s Privilege of 1561 had entitled them to hold their lands as allodial 
goods, in other words, that they had unlimited right of disposal over their lands. The 
incorporation of Livonia returned to the agenda, but the idea was again abolished. The 
Livonians were allowed to keep their Landtag, but its powers were markedly reduced, and 
it came under tighter control by the crown. The governor-general was now to nominate 
the foreman of the Landtag, which could only be summoned with the king’s approval, 
and the Landtag was only to handle questions concerning the nobility’s contributions 
to the crown. The position of the Swedish language was, furthermore, strengthened in 
the administration, so that the nobility would “grow more and more accustomed to the 
[Swedish] language”. A significant reform came with the Swedish Church Law of 1686, 
which also came into force in Livonia in 1690. The new law radically changed the Livoni-
an church administration. Lower consistories, as members of which noblemen had exert-
ed considerable influence, were abolished and their tasks given to secular authorities and 
parish priests. A similar “mixed” Upper Consistorium, in which noblemen were also rep-
resented, was also abolished and replaced by a spiritual consistory in Dorpat. The nobility 
lost its ius patronatus in most of the parishes, which now came under the crown’s control.2 
To find out what happened to criminal procedure in Livonia during the Swedish peri-
od, we need to know what Livonian criminal procedure was like before the conquest, be-
cause legal structures develop from the existing ones. Are the typical features and chang-
es in the Livonian criminal procedure, as seen from the court practise of The Pernau 
Land Court and The High Court of Dorpat, to be explained by the Swedish development 
at all? The 1680s and 1690s will be of particular interest, being the decades known for 
the Swedes taking a firmer grip of the Livonian nobility. Does this show in the criminal 
procedure?3
2 The context of european criminal law: inquis-
itorial and accusatorial procedures
Before going into the Livonian criminal law as it figures in the statutes and court practice, 
it is worthwhile to look into the common European criminal law at the beginning of the 
seventeenth century, the time of the Swedish conquest. Criminal law and criminal pro-
cedure had experienced a fundamental shift in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries; in-
2 The fundamental work on these questions is Isberg, Karl XI och den livländska adeln: studier rörande det 
karolinska enväldets införande i Livland (Lindstedts Universitetsbokhandel 1953). 
3 The article is based on my forthcoming book on Livonian law and judiciary during the Swedish period. 
The examples are taken from the material I have collected from the Latvian Historical Archives (Riga) and 
Estonian State Archive (Tartu). 
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deed, criminal law and procedure as a separate category emerged during these centuries. 
Criminal procedure as clearly separate from civil procedure took shape from the times 
of Pope Innocent III (1198–1216) onwards, when inquisitorial procedure was gradually 
introduced as a regular part of the canon law of crimes, starting with disciplinary pro-
cesses against clerics.4 If criminal law is understood as a “public criminal law”, as Dietmar 
Willoweit does, a decisive turning point ought to be connected to the procedural reforms 
mentioned above. This is because it was the inquisitorial procedure that helped the eccle-
siastical and secular political power to gain a monopoly over serious crime. The change 
took a long time to be completed, however, and its pace was vastly different in different 
parts of Europe – of which Livonia, as we will see, is one example. 
The basic structure of European criminal law remained by and large the same until 
the early modern period; the next large change was not to take place until the eighteenth 
century and the Enlightenment. Since its emergence in the twelfth century, the Europe-
an criminal procedure had been divided into the inquisitorial and the accusatorial, the 
“extraordinary” and the “ordinary” procedure.5 In leading Italian and German scholar-
ly works, the accusatorial procedure was presented as the basic model of criminal pro-
cedure, and remained so until the breakdown of the ancien régime criminal law in the 
nineteenth century.6 Historians of criminal law have, however, shown this to be factually 
misleading: at least at the beginning of the sixteenth century, it is said, the inquisitorial 
procedure had overtaken the accusatorial one in most parts of Europe. According to 
Eberhardt Schmidt, in German early modern criminal law “beherrscht durch die Ten-
denz, das Anklageverfahren durch den Inquisitionsprozeß zu verdrängen”, although the 
accusatorial procedure never completely lost its importance,7 as several works on the 
local legal praxis have confirmed. Early modern states, with their legal orders, sought to 
limit the participation of the plaintiff. This meant that the inquisitorial procedure was 
brought to the forefront as far as crime control was concerned. In his classic work on 
the history of French criminal procedure (Histoire de la procédure criminelle) Adhémar 
4 See Hirte, Papst Innozenz III., das IV. Lateranum und die Strafverfahren gegen Kleriker: eine registergestütz-
te Untersuchung zur Entwicklung der Verfahrensarten zwischen 1198 und 1216 (Diskord 2005); and Tru-
sen, “Der Inquisitionsprozess: Seine Historische Grundlagen und frühen Formen”, Zeitschrift der Savig-
ny-Stiftung Kanonistische Abteilung 74 (1988), 168-230. Hirte has attempted to revise the current opinion 
expressed by Trusen, according to which the old fama procedure against the clerics evolved into an in-
quisitorial procedure under Innocent III. According to Hirte’s study based on the records of Innocent III, 
the fama procedure did not disappear, although the inquisitorial method appeared in connection with the 
visitations whenever a clamor called for a closer inspection. 
5 See Jerouschek, “Die Herausbildung des peinlichen Inquisitionsprozesses im Spätmittelalter und in der 
frühen Neuzeit“, Zeitschrift für die Gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft 104 (1992), 328-360; and Koch, Denun-
ciatio: Zur Geschichte eines strafprozessualen Rechtsinsitituts (Klostermann 2006).
6 See, for instance, Clarus, Practica Criminalis, in Opera omnia sive Practica civilis atque criminalis, Liber V 
(Venice, 1640); and Carpzov, Practica nova imperialis Saxonia rerum criminalium (Wittenberg, 1652)
7 Schmidt, Einführung in die Geschichte der deutschen Strafrechtspflege (Göttingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht, 
1965), 194-195.
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Esmein claimed that the accusatorial procedure, “a remnant of the past”, was rarely used 
after the fourteenth century. It gradually lost ground, and the Ordinance of 1670 was then 
wholly dominated by the inquisitorial procedure.8 For the German lands, Karl Härter 
has shown using court records that the accusatorial procedure vanished in some parts of 
Kurmainz, probably soon after the introduction of Carolina and at the latest by the late 
sixteenth century.9 Although the accusatorial principle remained, in theory, primarily in 
the ius commune, in practice the inquisitorial procedure gained the upper hand in crim-
inal procedure in much of Central Europe by the beginning of the early modern period.
The problem with the recent accounts is, however, that they draw their court prac-
tice evidence (if any is used) from the core areas of Europe, France, Germany, and Italy. 
Esther Cohen has refuted Esmein’s conclusions in a recent work. Cohen emphasises that 
“whatever or whenever the shift from the accusatorial to the inquisitorial procedure be-
gan, it was neither unidirectional nor general. It was a slow process which knew many 
reversals, and ... one which took shape in different areas at different times”.10 Generalisa-
tions regarding the “European” criminal procedure cannot be made as if the development 
in those countries were representative of the rest of the continent as well. More area stud-
ies are needed from the more peripheral areas. As will be shown, the accusatorial pro-
cedure remained pivotally important in seventeenth-century Livonia, and its relation to 
the inquisitorial procedure was far more complicated than one of the procedural modes 
simply giving way. Before we go into the Livonian procedure, a brief look at the Swedish 
criminal procedure will be needed to provide a picture that differs vastly from Esmein’s 
account of France. 
At the beginning of the seventeenth century, the Swedish legal system, although in 
contact with the Roman-canon ius commune since the thirteenth century, had retained 
many of its archaic features. Lawyers and learned judges were a rare sight in Swedish 
courts of law, and virtually no Swedish legal science to speak of existed. Whatever “re-
ception” of Roman law there had been in Sweden, the veneer of learned law was thin.11 
Whether the Swedish procedure in the seventeenth century was of accusatorial or 
inquisitorial nature, some movement towards inquisitorial procedure is discernible. For 
one thing, the legal theory of proof was replacing the ancient procedure based on oaths. 
8 Esmein, Histoire de la procédure criminelle en France et spécialment de la procédure inquisitoire depuis le 
XIIIe siècle jusqu´à nos jours (Paris: Larose et Forcel, 1882), 108-109. See also Langbein, Prosecuting Crime 
in the Renaissance: England, Germany, France (The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. 2013) pp. 210-222.
9 Härter, “Regionale Strukturen und Entwicklungslinien frühneuzeitlicher Strafjustiz in einem geistlichen 
Territorium: Die Kurmainzer Cent Starkenburg”, Archiv für Hessische Geschichte und Altertumskunde 54 
(1996), pp. 111–162.
10 Cohen, “Inquiring Once More After the Inquisitorial Process”, in Die Entstehung des öffentlichen Strafrechts 
(ed. Dietmar Willoweit), Böhlau 1999, pp. 42–65. 
11 The University of Uppsala had been founded in the late fifteenth century, but had been closed down in the 
turmoil of the Lutheran Reformation. The University was reopened in the late sixteenth century, but mainly 
in order to train priests.
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The burden of proof shifted logically from the accused to the plaintiff. The officialdom in 
charge of criminal prosecution was also strengthened. The länsmän, bailiffs, now got the 
right to press charges should the victimised party fail to do so and, in cases involving state 
finances, a prosecutor’s office of its own was established in towns. A significant detail is 
that in 1682 a royal letter established that whenever there was as “general rumour” that a 
serious crime had been committed, the judge had to start investigating the case ex officio, 
even though no one was yet suspected of the crime. 
As the Lutheran Church also evolved into an important vehicle of social control as 
far as sexual crime was concerned, it seems that the official mechanisms of crime control 
were at least strengthening. Criminal sanctions also became harsher, although many of 
them were not applied to the letter of the law – which was, of course, an inherent part of 
the criminal law ideology of the time. David Nerhman, the most prominent legal writer 
of the eighteenth century, describes the Swedish criminal procedure of the Law of the 
Realm of 1734 in inquisitorial terms12 and, as we know, the Law of Realm is often taken 
to summarise the main legal developments of the seventeenth century. Thus, if the Law 
of the Realm seems inquisitorial, it would be a sign of a development in that direction in 
the previous century. 
Other facts point to the opposite conclusion, however, suggesting that inquisitorial 
procedure at least was not thoroughly institutionalised during the seventeenth centu-
ry. As I have shown elsewhere, attempts to introduce legal torture were finally rejected 
during the second half of the century. Since the rejection was not for humanitarian rea-
sons but practical ones, it is likely that the desire to uncover material truth by official 
means was not a primary objective, much responsibility still being left for the injured 
party.13 Court records, especially from the more remote corners of the realm, show that 
the practical reality was often far from inquisitorialness.14 
Curiously, in several German territories the accusatorial procedure also retained its 
primary position long into the eighteenth century. In East Prussia, the accusatorial pro-
cedure was finally abolished in 1724.15 In Bavaria, the accusatorial procedure was used 
only occasionally in the middle of the eighteenth century, and the Theresiana allowed the 
accusatorial procedure only exceptionally.16 In seventeenth-century Baden, all crimes, 
including the so-called Real- und Verbalinjurien were inquisitorially handled. The accu-
12 [Nehrman–]Ehrenstråhle, Inledning til Then Swenska Processum Criminalem (Lund: Kiesewetter, 1759). 
13 See Pihlajamäki, “The Painful Question: The Fate of Judicial Torture in Sweden”, Law and History Review 
25:3 (2007), 557-592. 
14 See, for instance, the digitalised lower court materials from seventeenth-century Finland at http://www.
digiarkisto.org/sshy/kirjat/Tuomiokirjat/RAHAD/RAHAD.htm (read: November 28th, 2011). 
15 Schmidt, 199-202.
16 See Wettmann-Jungblut, “‘Stelen inn rechter hungersnodtt’: Diebstahl, Eigentumsschutz und strafrechtli-
che Kontrolle im vorindustriellen Baden 1600-1850”, in Verbrechen, Strafen und soziale Kontrolle: Studien 
zur historischen Kulturforschung in (ed. van Dülmen), Fischer 1990), pp. 133- 177, at pp. 142-143.
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satorial procedure was completely abolished in Prussia only in 1788. In many territories, 
the inquisitorial procedure evolved into a “mixed procedure” (prozessuelle Mischform), 
in which the position of the official prosecutor (Fiskal) became important. In East Prus-
sian processum mixtum, for instance, the Fiskal acted as the prosecutor in an accusato-
rial procedure, but could rely on a previous inquisitorial inquisition. The procedure was 
thus started with an inquisition, after which the procedure became accusatorial, with the 
Fiskal taking over. Judicial torture could also be used, in which case the inquisitorial fea-
tures again took over. The accusatorial procedure by no means excluded judicial torture, 
which is important to understanding some of our Livonian cases. As we shall see, the 
activities of the official prosecutor play an important role as well. 
Some comparative conclusions can already be drawn. First, the regions where inquis-
itorial procedure overtook the accusatorial procedure in the early modern period were 
those where the modern state, in the centralised and bureaucratised sense of the word, 
also developed. Second, the inquisitorial mode of criminal proceedings could not fully 
develop without an effective corps of trained legal professionals staffing the courts. France 
clearly met both these criteria, as did some areas in Germany and Italy as well, thus being 
able to oust the active plaintiff in criminal affairs by the seventeenth century. Sweden also 
met the criterion of centralisation, but it lacked a corps of professional lawyers. Livonia 
had or at least soon developed a legal profession, but its loosely structured political or-
ganisation was not capable of forcing an effective legal procedure on its nobility. 
3 The Livonian criminal procedure
Criminal procedures thus reflect the strength or the lack of the central power, as well as 
the legal learning available in the local courts. The lack of a strong central government 
leaves space for the criminal procedures to develop or remain as they are, but the de-
centralised political system hardly determines precisely how procedures are shaped. The 
legal learning and social structure of the society comes into the picture instead and is 
sometimes clearly reflected in the criminal procedures. 
Considering the typical background of Livonian jurists in German law schools, it is 
understandable that the Livonian legal courts were so prone to take over the gemeines 
Recht procedure, which was thus overwhelmingly oriented towards the inquisitorial 
procedure in the seventeenth century. Formal schooling does not, however, automati-
cally lead to particular solutions if other circumstances are not favourable to them. In 
Livonia, the criminal procedure was structured by the estate, as was the whole society. 
The main division was simple: inquisitorial procedure was used only against peasants, 
whereas criminal cases against noblemen were accusatorial. The accusatorial procedure 
had an important role to play all through the Swedish period. The statutory basis for the 
accusatorial and the inquisitorial procedure was still Constitutio Criminalis Carolina (the 
criminal statute of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation of 1534) in the seven-
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teenth century, although Livonia no longer belonged to the Holy Empire of the German 
Nation.17 The accusatorial procedure in its pure form, individual against individual, was 
common in the Livonian courts all through the Swedish period. According to the Land-
gerichtsordnung of 1632 (Art. XXV), the accusatorial procedure was the main rule in all 
criminal cases against noblemen, the only exception being the “severe crimes” (“hoch-
pönliche Laster”), which were to be processed inquisitorially. The term was obviously a 
translation of the Swedish högmål, which constituted the most serious category of crimes 
in Sweden proper in the middle ages. 
The procedure in accusatorial cases was written to a large extent. Thus when Heinrich 
von Dam accused Jochim Schumacher of having stuck him with a knife (injuria realium) 
in the Lower Town of Pernau in 1662, von Dam´s advocate, Johann Ficken, handed the 
charges to the Court in written form (libellus). Schumacher, present in the court, replied 
at once that the incident had not taken place at all as it was stated in the written charge, 
but that he “had had to act in self-defence”. The Court, however, ordered Schumacher to 
reply in writing the next day. On the next day, the accused turned up in court again and 
stated that he had not been able to produce the written reply because he was preparing 
for a journey. Instead, he asked whether the plaintiff could not appear in person as well. 
Von Dam’s advocate did not consent to this, because his client was sick.18 If von Dam and 
the Court had consented, that would have been an exception to basic written mode of 
accusatorial procedure. 
At the beginning of the Swedish period, the inquisitorial features of the Livonian 
criminal procedure were undeveloped. The courts did not seem to be particularly active 
in directing the procedure, and the injured party sometimes even had to bring homicide 
cases to the court themselves. Maetz, a soldier from Fellin, charged another soldier, Erich 
Kieffer, in the Pernau Land Court on February 23, 1641, with killing of his brother Thom-
as, asking the court to sentence Erich to an “ordinary punishment” (mit der Scherpffen 
deß rechtenß möchte gestraffet warden, daß er hinwiederumb mit der ordentlichen straeff 
der thoetschläger möchte beleget vnd abgestraffet warden). Erich confessed to the charges 
without being tortured and was executed.19 
17 v. Blauckenhagen, “Beiträge zur Kenntniß des Strafrechts während der schwedischen Periode in Livland”, 
in Dorpater Juristische Studien, Band IV (eds. Engelmann, Erdmann, von Rohland), Dorpat: Karow 1896, 
pp. 247-314, at pp. 248-249. See also the Landgerichtsordnung of Oesel from the year 1650, which is attached 
as an appendix to Blauckenhagen’s article. According to article 11 of the statute, “sollen die Urtheile auff die 
Uhralte Landsübliche Recessen und Gebräuche, auch auff Kayserliche Rechte, weil daß Gerichte darauff 
privilegiret, fundiret und gegründet werden”, and Article 14 states that “In Hochpeinlichen Sachen soll 
wie vorhin, vermöge Caroli Vti Halßgerichtsordnung verfahren ... werden. Doch soll diese Ordnung nach 
gelegenheit der Zeit und vorlaufenden Fällen gebessert, gemindert oder gemehrt werden.” 
18 “Bekl. soll morgenden tages schrifftlich antwortten, auch beyderseite Parten ihre Zeugen mitbringen.” Per-
nau lower court 1662, Estonian State Arhcives (ESA) 1000.1.723, f. 7. 
19 Pernau lower court 1641, ESA.1000.1.723, f. 23 – 23 a. See also, e.g., Jamma Matz vs. Putreck Matz in a 
homicide case 1640, ESA 915.1.3. 
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As for minor offences, such as slander, it was all the more clear that the procedure de-
pended entirely on the injured party’s actions. In 1640, Christoffer Schiltt accused Berent 
Eggert of slandering him and his family at his home, and of attacking his wife and his 
children. Schiltt could not prove his charges, and Eggert was acquitted.20 
There were, however, limits to the individual’s activity in defending his or her inter-
ests. It was important for the courts to sanction independent use of violence. The formula 
“sein eigen richter”, to be “one’s own judge”, figures in the early years of the Swedish period 
court records. Magnus Anrep, for instance, was punished in 1640 for dragging Arendt 
von Hursen’s serf onto Anrep’s own manor and having the serf lashed. Anrep accused the 
serf of stealing honey and took also a saddle from the serf as a pledge until the honey was 
replaced. The Court found Anrep’s activities unacceptable and punished him for being 
“his own judge” (“weilen er sein eigen richter gewest”).21
The purest examples of inquisitorial cases in the Livonian courts practice are never-
theless the cases of serious crime, in which peasants stand as the accused, cases some-
times listed as criminalia in the courts protocols. They are often also listed using the for-
mula “The Land Court of X contra Y”, denoting that there is no accusing party (as in the 
accusatorial processes) but that the court itself undertakes the prosecution. The Pernau 
Land Court minutes of the years 1688–1690 contain such a list of Criminalia. They are 
not many, only ten altogether, and there is no mention of the proceedings or sentence.22 
What do these cases have in common to warrant their classification as criminalia? 
Clearly the inquisitorial procedure: eight of the cases are court-driven (“Das Königl. 
Landgrt ex officio”), whereas one is prosecuted by the pastor and one by a peasant againt 
the Cubias, foreman of the peasants. Those on the list share one more trait, all of them 
being serious crimes: homicide, infanticide, desertions, blasphemy and incest – which, 
logically, do not figure in the ordinary minutes. The pastor’s case seems only to have dealt 
with the slandering of the pastor and his wife, although “grossly”, and one of the cases re-
mains otherwise unclear (“verheliget”). Adultery figures in some of the criminalia as one 
of the crimes, but clearly it was not by itself sufficient to merit placement in this category. 
The possibility of inflicting blood sentences was not enough by itself – for instance, adul-
tery was punishable by death. To sum up, in order to be classified as an ordinary crime, 
a wrongdoing had to severe enough, and they were practically all handled inquisitorially 
by the court. All of the accused were peasants. 
20 Pernau lower court 1640, 915.1.3.f. 11a –12a. Eggert did not deny having used calumnious words, but 
claimed not to have intended to slander. The Court concluded that no he had not spoken animo injuriandi. 
21 ESA 915.1.3. f. 23 a. 
22 Pernau Land Court 1690,  f. 732–733.
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Denunciatory cases also appear.23 However, the ius commune theory did not draw 
far-reaching consequences about the way criminal cases were initiated. Even though the 
case was basically an accusatorial (or denunciatory) one, the court could assume charge 
of actively leading the process and could apply judicial torture if deemed necessary. As 
Massimo Meccarelli has shown, the judicial arbitrium in the ius commune procedure 
brought considerable flexibility as to what the course (iter) a case could assume. Even 
though a case could start as accusatorial or by way of a denunciation, it could later be 
taken over by the court and thus change into an inquisitorial one.24 
The way the Land Court of Pernau 1640-41 handled the case of four peasants accused 
of the murder of a Finnish soldier fits the picture of the ius commune criminal proce-
dure as being flexible. The case against Zeamick Ewert, Pick Peter, Sava Otti and Lutzin 
Bertel was brought to the Court by the “denunciation” (delatio) of Wilibalt von Bergen, 
a nobleman, and the “charge” (Anklage) of the wife of the murdered soldier. Technically, 
the case was thus a mixture of an accusatorial and a denunciatory one. Although torture 
was not applied in this case, the court otherwise did everything it could to solve the case, 
where von Bergen and the victim’s wife did not figure actively in the proceedings after 
they had brought the case to court. The Court’s primary concern was, of course, to have 
the accused confess. This was not easy, and one of the accused, Zeamick Ewert, seemed 
particularly stubborn, claiming that Pick Peter and Lutzin Bertel had been the killers. The 
other three confessed more easily to the most of the charges. The Court took advantage 
of this, using the interrogatory technique of “confrontation” (confrontatio), which meant 
interrogating the suspects simultaneously. This proved successful, and having heard Peter 
and Bertel testify against him, Ewert’s resistance broke down and he confessed as well.25 
A sub-category of the inquisitorial cases – or of denunciatory cases – was those in 
which the lower courts proceeded on the basis of a “delinquent list” (Delinquentenzettel, 
lista delinquentium) provided by a local pastor. The pastor thus initiated the case, after 
which the investigation was taken over by the court. On June 29, 1640, pastor Christo-
phorus Sevarius brought three cases to the Land Court of Pernau holding assizes at the 
Rugen Manor. One of them involved infanticide and the two other cases fornication.26 
23 In early modern criminal procedure, denunciatory procedure was the third form of procedure apart from 
the accusatorial and inquisitorial ones. In denunciatory procedure, the victim (or the victim’s family) 
brought the case to the court, after which the court proceeded actively to investigate the case, much the 
same way as in the inquisitorial proceedings. 
24 Meccarelli, Arbitrium : Un aspetto sistematico degli ordinamenti giuridici in età di diritto comune (Milan : 
Giuffrè 1998). 
25 ESA 915.1.4. f. 23 a – 27 a. See also, Pernau town court 1641, ESA.1000.1.723, f. 23 a – 27 a. “E. E. Rahtt 
schloß, weiln mann auß allen vmbständen sehe, daß der Inqvisitus mehrere Diebstall begangen, daß mti 
der scharffen frage zu versuchen, ob Er dabei bliebe, daß der Herman mit Ihme daß Diebstalß halber ger-
ahttschlaget, weiln iener eß leständig läugnet, auch sonsten alles nicht über ein stimmet.” 
26 ESA 915.1.3. f. 41 a – 46 a. 
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These cases show how churchmen actively cooperated with secular authorities in the 
fight against sexual crime.27
Judicial torture was used regularly, although by no means often, in the early Swedish 
period, and of course only against peasants or strangers. The procedure followed the ius 
commune mode, which the case of Maye and “the old Saikat woman” (no first name giv-
en in the sources) of 1641 shows clearly. In July of 1640, the Pernau Lower Court heard 
Maye, suspected of infanticide, and the old Saikat woman of assisting the crime. Both de-
nied this, and the Court decided to proceed to torture. The Saikat woman testified against 
Maye, so the required half a proof was at hand, although the amount of proof is not 
specifically elaborated upon in the Court’s decision. The Court only states that “since the 
protocols show and [both of the accused] have participated in the infanticide, but have 
not been willing to confess, they will be tortured, starting with the old lady.”28 However, 
suspects could not be tortured without the High Court’s permission; thus, torture was 
suspended until the High Court of Dorpat gave its approval.29 The High Court took sev-
en months to issue its torture permission, and the case was taken up again at the Pernau 
Court in February 1641. The old Saikat woman did not confess under torture, but con-
tinued blaming Maye alone, saying that in fact she had given birth to twins. Maye denied 
this, claiming that her child had been born dead. The protocols stress that the accused 
was then asked “many times, before, during and after the torture” how she had disposed 
of the body. The torture was continued the following day. She maintained that she had 
only given birth to one child, but now confessed that she had killed the child and given it 
to the old Saikat woman, so that she could hide the body with the help of her son. Accord-
ing the judicial doctrine, the confession had to be repeated after the torture in order to be 
valid. Maye repeated her confession word by word (“wörttlichen”) and was condemned 
to death. The old Saikat woman, apparently while no full proof could be produced against 
her, was sentenced to whipping only. And a final observation of interest: the sentence was 
ordered to be carried out at once, “because the facts were evident and undeniable.”30 
Judicial torture lessened towards the last decades of the Swedish period, so much so 
that it finally disappeared – as in Sweden proper. In 1668, however, the Pernau Town 
Court decided to torture Karro Hans to find out whether Parrihild Herman had really 
27 See also Aalto, Kirkko ja kruunu siveellisyyden vartijoina: seksuaalirikollisuus, esivalta ja yhteisö Porvoon 
kihlakunnassa 1621–1700 (Helsinki: Suomen historiallinen seura 1996). 
28 “Demnach ex actis criminalibus befindlich, daß Beklagtin Mayge vnd die Saicketsche in diesem Infanticidy 
crimins beede participiren, vnd aber guettlichen nicht bekennen wollen, woh sie daß kindt gelassen, nach 
dem eß an die weldt kommen; Alß wurden sie beede ad Torturum condemniret, vnd sol der anfang deß 
tortureß von der Seickettsche gemacht werden.” ESA 915.1.3., f. 46.
29 Vnd wirdt die Tortura suspendiret, bieß diese Sententia vom Königl. Hoffgericht declassiret. ESA 915.1.3., 
f. 46.
30 ESA 915.1.4., f. 14 a–15. 
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acted as his accessory in horse theft.31 The torture took place “around 3 o’clock” in the 
morning of April 8th, 1668. The questions were protocolled, as well as the answers. After 
the torture, Hans was asked, thus approximately according to the theory of judicial tor-
ture, whether he still held to what he had said under torture. Hans replied affirmatively, 
“after which the actus inquisitionis was terminated for this time, and the suspect was 
taken back to his cell” (Womit der Actus inqvisitionis vor dieß mahl geendiget, vndt der 
gefangener wieder zur vorigen hafft geführet).32
However, the dichotomy between accusatorial and inquisitorial cases does not fully 
encompass the development of criminal procedure in Livonia. At least two other features 
need treatment before we can come to the conclusions. The first of these features, crimi-
nal settlements, was on the decline; the other, involvement of an accusing official on the 
rise. I will start with the settlements. 
4 Settling criminal cases
In the early years parties also often settled criminal cases, which shows how much room 
for manoeuvre was left to them.33 This is no wonder, because criminal settlements were 
not uncommon in early modern Germany either. Against this comparative context, it 
would be strange if no settlements were found in the Livonian case material. Early mod-
ern settlements of criminal cases survived in Germany as long as they did in a procedur-
al environment which was becoming increasingly hostile to arrangements that left too 
much say for the parties to the criminal cases themselves. This was the grand lineage of 
the medieval and early modern procedural development. 
Even though the inquisitorial procedure was thus vigorously making its way in early 
modern Europe from the late middle Ages onwards, there are great geographical and 
temporal variations on this theme. For instance, the German regions most resistant to the 
Rezeption, mainly the ones in which Sachsenspiegel was relevant, were also resistant to the 
inquisitorial procedure. Even if the Bambergensis and the Carolina already provided for 
the inquisitorial procedure, local legislation still allowed for Sühneverträge in the early 
seventeenth century. The rising inquisitorial procedure thus existed side by side with 
the archaic settlements of serious crime for a long time.34 Hardly surprisingly, criminal 
31 Pernau town court 1688, ESA 1001.1.723., 61.
32 Pernau town court 1688, ESA 1001.1.723., 64–66.
33 How many of the settlements came to be recorded and how many remained extrajudicial is difficult to say, 
of course. 
34 Deutsch, “Späte Sühne: Zur praktischen und rechtlichen Einordnung der Totschlagsühneverträge in Spät-
mittelalter und früher Neuzeit“, Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte, Germanistische Abtei-
lung 122  (2005), pp. 113–149, at pp. 131–137. 
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settlements were common in Sweden as well. Cases were sometimes settled even at the 
appeals court level.35 
Slander cases are the most typical example of settlements. Could we speak of a kind 
of Justiznutzung, or taking advantage of the law, in the way this term has been utilised in 
the literature? It has been emphasised that the law was not only imposed on the parties 
from above, but that the people took advantage of the legal services of the community 
instead, thus converting courts into instruments they could exploit to press the other par-
ty to yield concessions, settlement money and other benefits. From the plaintiff ’s point 
of view, the point was not necessarily to have the other party formally convicted, but to 
further other ends. 
The case of Leuco Thomas from 1640 at least shows that the local populace could 
sometimes be actively involved in the court proceedings. A peasant named Leuco Thom-
as had, according to Christian Winckelmann, accused him of taking unlawful advantage 
of his position by selling the manor’s corn on his own account. Winckelmann denied this 
and challenged Thomas to step forward with evidence. Thomas could not produce any 
and was sentenced to 10 pairs of lashes. At this point, Thomas and his wife turned to the 
court and asked it to spare him from the punishment, because it might injure him. Thom-
as had already been kept 14 days in irons, most probably by Winckelmann. 
The Administrator would not for a long while let this have any effect on him, but at last 
and after a plea from [Thomas and his wife] and the intervention of other peasants, he 
agreed that the Schilter would get off with only five pairs.
The peasants, however, still continued begging: 
Because they still did not give up asking for complete absolution of the punishment, and 
as the Court had him understand that it depended on him whether Thomas would remain 
unpunished or not, [the Administrator] agreed on Thomas´s impunity this time, where-
fore Thomas then lay down at his feet and thanked for the pardon.36
Settlements were not always approved, however. In 1690, Prosecutor Philipp Schirm ac-
cused the steward of Kirbel Manor, Matthis Donau, of assault on Christoph Beckmann, 
the steward of Moyseküla. According to the libellum, the parties had settled the case after 
Beckmann had asked the Court for a citation on Donau (“in zwischen beyde theils hi-
erüber vereinbahret...”). The settlement could not, however, override public interest (“...so 
kan dennach dieser Vergleich dem Interesse public nichts derogieren, sondern verdienet 
billige bestrafung.”). It may be that Schirm decided to prosecute for the assault too, be-
35 Karonen, “Rahakkaista sovitteluista valtiovallan väliintuloon: Henkirikosten sovittelu Ruotsin kaupungeis-
sa suurvalta-ajalla”, in Tie tulkintaan: Juhlakirja akatemiaprofessori Heikki Ylikankaalle 6. marraskuuta 1997 
(eds. Kekkonen, Aalto, Koivusalo, Kuisma), Helsinki: WSOY 1997, pp. 248–269. 
36 EAA, 915.1. 7., f. 119–121.
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cause he had already tried to get Donau to answer a fornication charge, for which Schirm 
was prosecuting again.37
Cases were settled regardless of whether there was evidence for slander or not. In 
some cases, the minutes tell us that the case was clear, in others it was not. This also goes 
to show that it was important for the courts to secure social peace by disposing of slander 
cases that threatened to disturb it. Although witnesses were occasionally heard in these 
cases, finding out what had actually happened was clearly of secondary importance com-
pared to re-establishing peace. 
Settlements in slander cases are often founded in the protocols of Livonian town 
courts, but less often in the country court papers. This is because the Livonian courts 
were, at least after the first few year of the Swedish rule, strictly estate-based, and not 
many slander cases came to the district courts. After the 1640s, minor cases between 
peasants do not appear in the courts observed here, pure peasant cases, be they slander 
cases, other petty crime, or civil cases, being decided directly on the manors by peasants’ 
courts. Peasants normally appeared in the district courts only when the other party was 
of higher social rank, as was in case Christian Winckelmann vs. Leuco Thomas, or when 
they were charged with criminalia, inquisitorially handled “real” criminal cases. 
Settlements in court by no means formed the basis of Livonian conflict solution in the 
seventeenth century. As the century advanced, such settlements became rare. The change 
cannot, however, be attributed to Swedish influence, be it direct or indirect. Still, it seems 
to have been possible to settle serious crimes, even homicide cases. Judging by the rarity 
of homicide settlements, however, they seem to have been on the way to extinction. The 
only example of this I have in my material is the case of Lellepe Peet and Hans Wardi 
which, according to the normal practice of poena extraordinaria, would almost certainly 
not have ended up in carrying out of the death penalty, because the deed was either not 
intentional or at least the intention of the wrongdoer could not be demonstrated.
5 The official prosecutors
Thus, in estimating how active the state was in crime control, we cannot only look at 
the extent to which the inquisitorial features had taken over the accusatorial traits in 
the criminal procedure. In addition, even older features could persist. For instance, even 
though the inquisitorial features dominated the peinlich procedure of Kursachsen from 
the late fifteenth century onwards, elements of ancient oath procedure (for example the 
Barprobe) persisted for a long time.38 As we have seen above, homicide cases in Livonia 
could still be occasionally settled even when most of these cases were already handled 
inquisitorially. In addition to these, the changing role of the official prosecutor is fun-
37 Pernau Lower Court 1690, f. 363–369.
38 Lück, “Sühne und Strafgerichtsbarkeit im Kursachsen des 15. und 16. Jahrhunderts”, in Neue Wege stra-
frechtsgeschichtlicher Forschung (eds. Schlosser, Willoweit), Böhlau 1999, pp. 83-99, at pp. 81-82.
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damentally important in understanding the development of Livonian or any other early 
modern criminal procedure. 
The debate on the role of official prosecutors in the development of the Livonian crim-
inal procedure was started in 1845 by Wilhelm von Bock and his little book On the His-
tory of Criminal Procedure in Livonia (Zur Geschichte des Criminalprozesses in Livland). 
Von Bock’s central claim was that the mixed procedure (Staatsanklageprozess) became 
dominant in the Swedish era.39 Although Bock’s findings met with sharp criticism,40 his 
findings still seem credible. Towards the end of the Swedish period, at least, the activity 
of the official prosecutors appears to have been on the rise. 
On the basis of the material available, no statistical evidence for the strengthening 
of the official prosecutor can be given. However, the available material seems to point to 
official prosecutors growing more active towards the end of the century. I will give some 
examples of this trend in what follows. The cases of prosecutorial activity typically had 
to do with prevention of self-help (taking the law into one’s own hands), protection of 
official interests, sexual and other serious crime, and duels. 
Prosecutor Philipp Schirm charged the steward Schwenewandel from Fellin with 
tearing down and burning a fence in connection with an argument about boundaries. 
The burning had caused “no little danger” (kein geringer Schade) because of the animals 
moving in the area. Self-help from the side of the accused seemed to anger the Prosecutor 
the most: he had “no right to cause unrest on another person’s property and even less in a 
violent way”.41 The prevention of self-help was typically something that prosecutors were 
interested in. 
Serious crime was thus one of the natural targets of prosecutorial activity in seven-
teenth-century Livonia. Sexual crime was one of subjects of social control where pros-
ecutors showed activity, as in the case that prosecutor Schirm in 1690 brought against 
Jochim Schneck, the weaver, and the “Weibstück” Mari, charged with adultery and forni-
cation. Schirm justified the criminal charge by the threat of divine punishment.42 
39 von Bock, Zur Geschichte des Criminalprozesses in Livland (Dorpat 1845). 
40 The dominant figure of nineteenth-century Livonian legal history, Friedrich Georg von Bunge showed that 
Bock’s results were not representative because they were based on relatively slight case material. Schwartz 
followed Bunge’s criticism in his “Zur Geschichte des livländischen Criminalprocesses während der Periode 
der schwedischen Herrschaft.” Schwarz, “Zur Geschichte des livländischen Criminalprocesses während der 
Periode der schwedischen Herrschaft”, Zeitschrift für Rechtswissenschaft herausgegeben von der juristischen 
Facultät der Universität Dorpat, zweiter Jahrgang, 1870, 29-80, 99-133, 32.
41 Pernau  Lower Court 1688, f. 128.
42 “Wenn hurerey und Ehebruch nicht solte gestraffet werden, würden die schädliche Laster so gemein 
werden, daß Eß bey keinem für Sünde dürffte geachtet werden, und ungeachtet die hurerey und Ehebruch 
so wohl in Gött= alß Weltlichen Rechten ernstl. und bey hoher straffe werbohten [...].” See also, Schirm vs. 
Capitain Ebert Engelhardt and his former maid Hilpig Roop. Lower Pernau Court 1690 f. 433; and Schirm 
v. second lieutenant Arnd Turlau. 
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At the end of the century, the prosecutor would handle at least some of the cases act-
ing alone as the prosecuting party, with the victims of the alleged crime only as witnesses. 
Thus in the case of actor officiosus Philipp Schirm vs. Gustav Nohthelffer, a merchant 
from Fellin, Schirm accused Nothhelffer (in puncto verübter haußgewalt) of entering the 
burgher Ebert Doben’s house and of attacking Zyriatus Iben, a soldier. According to the 
charges, Nohthelffer had used a sabre to wound Iben’s hand. Interestingly, Schirm justi-
fies the charge by appeal to criminal policy: 
…should violent crimes such as this go unpunished, no-one would be able to live in peace 
in their houses and under their roofs, and despite the fact that domestic peace should be 
the most protected, Mr. Gustav Nohthelffer gave little thought to this …43 
The victims (Doben and Iben) did not figure as parties to the suit, probably because they 
did not want a law suit in the first place, but the prosecutor acted nevertheless. In its in-
terlocutory sentence, the court obliged the prosecutor to summon the alleged victims to 
the court as witnesses.44 
In the case of Rittmeister Schlippenbach vs. Lieutenant Wachtell from 1690, Schirm 
asked for continuance because even though Schlippenbach had “passed a case involving 
gross iniuria” on to him, the prosecutor had not had time to gather “enough information” 
on the case.45 It seems thus to have been clear to the contemporaries in any case that it 
was one of the prosecutor’s tasks to bring charges for serious crimes. In this case, the 
discussion makes it clear that the term atrocissimi iniuria referred to a duel. The Court of 
Pernau decided to absolve Wachtell, stating however, that “should the plaintiff not wish 
to drop the case completely, it is his responsibility to bring it to the next court session de 
novo”. 
Perhaps not too much attention should be paid to the Court’s formulation that it was 
the plaintiff ’s, not the prosecutor’s, responsibility to bring charges. However, the two ways 
of pursuing charges in what was certainly seen as a serious breach of the law, were clearly 
both seen as possible. The duelling cases were thus not purely inquisitorial, and could 
well proceed accusatorially as well. This goes to show that the limits of the procedural 
modes were flexible and often influenced by practical considerations. 
Duelling cases are one of those points in the history of Livonian criminal procedure 
where Swedish influence is at its clearest. The duel, a typical early modern phenomenon 
in many parts of Europe, had become such a problem in Sweden that a law against it 
43 “...daß wenn Gewaltthaten nicht solten gestraffet werden, würde keiner in seiner Hütten, und unter seinem 
Dache gesichert leben können, und ohngeachtet der hauß friede am meisten gesichert seyn soll, hatt den-
noch beKlr. Mons: Gustav Nohthelffer dieses wenig betrachtet...” Pernau Land Court 1690, f. 169–171.
44 Pernau Land Court 1690, f. 432. 
45 Pernau Land Court 1690, f. 480–481.
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was issued in 1682 (Duellplacat).46 Studies lacking, it is difficult to say whether duels had 
really increased in Sweden, or whether the Duellplacat was merely part of the crown’s 
campaign against the nobility, duelling typically belonging to the “autonomous” sphere 
of this estate. Whatever the case, the official prosecutors in Livonia took the Duellplacat 
seriously. In the Archive of the Dorpat High Court, traces of 28 duelling cases remain in 
1670-1690. When divided into five-year periods, the spread of these cases looks like this: 
1671–75: 5 cases, 1676–80: 0 cases, 1681–85: 20 cases, and 1686–90: 3 cases. A clear ma-
jority of the cases thus falls into the 1680s and thus into the period immediately following 
the issuance of the Duellplacat. 
The prosecutors, however, lacked the means for effective crime control. All of the 
duelling cases were handled accusatorially, with the high court prosecutor (Oberfiskal) 
acting as the plaintiff. As was typical of the accusatorial cases, the process in duelling 
cases was largely written. The defendants often did not show up, and the prosecutor’s 
action seemed to lead nowhere.47 When defendants showed up for trial, they were often 
acquitted – as in the Wachtell case above. 
The duelling cases were of course serious as crimes, and they also had to do with 
public order. The wish to maintain public order was also otherwise typical of the prose-
cutorial cases, as when Prosecutor Philipp Schirm brought charges against Jacob Bremer 
for robbery (rapina ex violentiarum). The alleged crime had taken place on a highway and 
was particularly serious. Schirm noted that “this kind of open street violence especially” 
should be curbed and “the highway secured in the future”.48 
Some of the official prosecution cases were clearly intended to uphold social order, 
even when the crime itself may not have been serious. A class of legal cases in which 
potential private accusers were completely lacking was the various modes of disrespect 
towards authorities. This was a natural field of activity for public prosecutors. To uphold 
the crown’s honour, it was especially important to keep order in court. The officers Arent 
Turlau, Dettloff v. Plate and David Remling were therefore charged by Schirm in 1688 for 
contempt of court (“improper behaviour against each other before the Court”; “in puncto 
immodesten verfahrung gegen einander vor Gericht”). It was, however, often difficult to get 
noblemen to appear in court as accused, even though the courts threatened them with 
46 An earlier Duelplacat had been issued in 1662, and duels were again forbidden in the See and War Articles 
of 1686. 
47 See, for instance, the official prosecutor vs. Lieutenant Georg Stackelberg (provocatio ad duellum). Even 
summonsing did not manage to bring Stackelberg to court. In absentia “in hundert dahl. Silb: Mtz. dem 
Gerichte für Straffe und Actori officioso die Expensen.” 28.10.1693.
48 Pernau Land Court 1688, f. 50–57.
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punishment.49 Thus in 1690 Schirm cited Lieutenant Johan Grack to the Lower Court of 
Pernau for disrespecting a court order (vilipendirung gerichtlichen befehls). 
In another case at the Pernau Lower Court heard in 1690, Schirm had summoned 
Lieutenant Daniel Brüning’s wife to Pernau Lower Court in 1689 for disrespect of court 
orders. When it turned out that the Lieutenant was not at home, the court servant 
(Gerichtsdiener) had delivered the summons to his wife instead. According to the pros-
ecutor, she had thrown the envelope away with “highest disrespect and slander” (“zum 
höschsten despect und beschimpffung”).50 Although the accused was acquitted for lack of 
evidence, it represents typical cases in which Livonian prosecutors were interested. 
The development of public prosecution was originally linked to the growth of police 
law in many parts of Europe. The close links between the Livonian prosecutorial offices 
and police law show in the way the prosecutorial tasks were defined as not only super-
vising the law in general but especially “der Erfüllung der königlichen Verordnungen, 
Decrete, Mandate”51; that is, typically the kinds of statutes likely to include police law.52 
On the other hand, classic areas of criminal law in Livonia such as theft depended 
entirely on the victim’s activity. Thus, for instance, in 1688 Lieutenant Colonel Brack-
ell accused Andres Hoch, a soldier, of having stolen a horse at the funeral of Brackell’s 
daughter.53 Slander cases were, it goes without saying, completely beyond the public pros-
ecutor’s sphere of action.54
6 Conclusions 
The Livonian criminal procedure did not change radically during the Swedish reign, re-
maining extremely estate-based throughout the seventeenth century. The peasants were 
treated inquisitorially only for serious crimes, their petty crimes being left for the peasant 
courts on the manors to decide. Noblemen’s crimes, the few that ever ended up in the 
courts, were treated accusatorially in the High Court at Dorpat. The campaign of the 
Swedish crown against Livonian nobility – so drastic in political and economic terms – 
did not seem to produce significant consequences for the way criminal procedure was 
arranged in the province. The pressure of the 1680s on the Livonian nobility was felt to be 
49 Pernau Land Court 1688, f. 140, 165. “Alß wird Er dahero alß aperte’ contumaß et supine negligens in 
poenam contumacia […] condemniret […].” Plate was again charged with improper behaviour in court in 
1690, f. 301. 
50 Pernau Lower Court 1690, f. 293–299.
51 Oberfiscalsinstruktion 8–10, 15; Kreisfiscalsinstruktion VI. 
52 See Schwartz, p. 62. 
53 Pernau Land Court 1688, f. 211–217. 
54 For instance, the case of Clas Fürstenberg, blacksmith, against Johann Lüders Scheider, a tailor, both from 
the Karkus manor. Pernau Land Court 1688, f. 223.
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an attempt to control the practice of duelling, but, because of the prevailing accusatorial 
mode of procedure, the effort did not produce significant results. 
The main reason for the stability of the way criminal procedures were organised is 
that although the autonomy of the Livonian nobility was severely curtailed vis-à-vis the 
Swedish crown, the nobility’s relations with the peasants suffered no great changes even 
during the 1680s and 1690s. Peasants remained tied to the soil and thus also to the peas-
ant courts on the manors. Neither was the Swedish local government, dependent on Li-
vonians themselves as it was, capable of exerting any effective judicial discipline on the 
noblemen, as the attempt to control duels in the 1680s clearly shows. 
Some things changed, however, when the first decades of Swedish rule are compared 
to the end of the century. The inquisitorial procedures against peasants in lower courts 
had become more routine, and were always handled inquisitorially without the victims 
needing to be active. The use of judicial torture ended, which well may have been Swed-
ish influence. The high courts followed each other’s decisions, and in 1652 Dorpat High 
Court even asked the Svea High Court, the most authoritative of the high courts, whether 
torture was still lawful. The answer was negative. The Svea High Court stated that “torture 
is not, and for many reasons, in use here in our country”. 55 
The greatest change during the Swedish reign was that the official prosecutors clearly 
grew more active. This change, however, is difficult to link directly to any obvious Swed-
ish influence. Even though parallel development occurred in Sweden proper, it was also 
parallel to the procedural changes taking place in e.g German territories. 
55 “Laga bewisning skier genom egen bekännelse, när swaranden friwiljandes och otwingat in för Rätten 
[...] bekänner ... men ingen bör pinas och plågas til någon bekännelse, efter som then samma uti Kongl. 
May:tz Rike obruklig samt i sig sielf fahrlig och owiss är.” The same wording was repeated in the Sea Arti-
cles of 1685. “Kongl. May:tz Förordning huruledes och hwad wid General och Regementz Rätterne under 
thes Militie hållas och uti acht tagas bör jämte någre korte Reglor som wid samme Rätter angående Laga 
Process, ransakning och domb observeras och efterlefwas skole,” in Kongl stadgar, förordninar, brev, och 
resolutioner, ifrån åhr 1528. in til 1701. angående Justitiae och Executions-Ährender, ed. Schmedemann 
(Stockholm 1706), p. 837.
